Abstract
Introduction
To secure ourselves against defeat lies in our own hands, but the opportunity of defeating an enemy is provided by the enemy himself.
Sun Tzu 1 Joint Vision 2020 calls for U.S. Joint Forces to strive for, and obtain Decision Superiority as the goal of their Command and Control Warfare (C2W) efforts. 2 The logical culmination of the pursuit for dominance across the cognitive hierarchy, Decision Superiority is the ability to make With the emergence of "the network" as a primary medium for storing and transmitting data and information, deception, which in and of itself is merely the passing of information, will take place within the digital domain. Deception in cyberspace poses unique challenges in its planning and execution: 1) Digital deception requires added coordination and deconfliction because it crosses the boundaries of four distinct but interrelated military doctrines, 2) The modern information environment is changing at a meteoric rate, 3) Information policies and laws are unclear and incomplete, and 4) The asymmetric nature of cyberspace activities collapses factor time while greatly increasing factors space and force.
The discussion that follows does not address the "mechanics" of designing and implementing deception (a subject thoroughly addressed in U.S. Joint Doctrine for Military Deception, Joint Pub 3-58), nor does it address the technical specifics of implementing digital deception (e.g., particular hardware, software, or network configurations: a subject requiring an advanced degree; or at least the vast experience of a teenage computer wizard). 3 The intent is to firmly establish in the reader's mind, an appreciation for:
1) How deception (traditional or digital) contributes to Information and Decision Superiority
2) The advantages of digital deception; particularly passive deception during a CNA
3) The challenges to planning and implementing digital deception 4) U.S. military doctrine affecting digital deception.
Superiority Across the Cognitive Scale
In order to achieve victory you must place yourself in your opponent ' What exactly is Decision Superiority? World War II (WWII) offers an excellent example.
In the Pacific Theater, the Japanese used analysis of past American operations and what they understood U.S. interests to be in order to simulate the American decision-making process. By analyzing the facts, they were able to envisage the plans that would best serve U.S. policy.
Although lacking intelligence information, the Japanese were highly successful in forecasting Allied decisions. They accurately predicted the American plan for parallel advances across the Pacific by Nimitz and MacArthur. They further predicted not only the islands on which the initial Allied invasion of the Japanese homeland would take place, but also the specific beaches to be breached. Incredibly, the Japanese successfully foretold the Allied plans before the Allies finalized what they would be.
Meanwhile, the United States and its allies were developing an elaborate deception operation, Operation PASTEL, to support the homeland invasion. PASTEL involved an extensive misinformation campaign, feigned air asset deployments, and phony supply drops to confuse the Japanese as to where and when the actual invasion would take place. However, based on their knowledge and beliefs formed by past U.S. actions, the Japanese fortified the correct areas and prepared a defense using the predicted U.S. plan as their blueprint. Even though the invasion of the Japanese homeland would never take place, one can conclude that the Allied deception plans were likely to have had marginal success in that the U.S. planners were unable to alter the understanding and beliefs of the Japanese. The Japanese enjoyed Decision Superiority.
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A basic overview of cognition will assist in understanding Japan's success in this example, and to lay the groundwork for successful deception: traditional and digital. Data, information, knowledge, and understanding are often treated as synonyms. They are in fact, descriptors of various stages of cognition: the evolution from raw data to information, information to knowledge, and knowledge to understanding. Data is individual measurements or observations. Information is data that is processed into a usable form: e.g., sorted, categorized, etc. Information assembled within a certain context becomes knowledge. Knowledge validated against a set of beliefs transforms to understanding. 6 Knowledge and understanding form the basis for making decisions. where it is needed, and 3) Implement information management processes and systems essential to doing business on the Internet. 16 These significant investments in network-based information management emphasize the extent to which the U.S. military is reliant on the digital domain. Such reliance will certainly draw the attention of U.S. adversaries, creating an opportunity to exploit their attempts at gathering digital information. Newland observes: "While the US [sic] will enjoy information superiority over virtually any adversary we may face, it should never be assumed that we will be allowed to retain it or use it to full advantage. What information superiority really means is being the one most dependent on computer and communications technology for combat success" (emphasis mine). 17 Digital deception does not differ from traditional deception with respect to its objective and design. It differs only in that the illusion is created in cyberspace. Digital deception can be a "standalone" operation, or an element of a more comprehensive deception plan in which other elements are also employed e.g., feints, demonstrations, psychological operations, etc.
Deceptive digital data and information can be passed to the enemy by either active or passive means. To pass the information actively, one would attempt to insert the information into the enemy's information environment. Active deception of this type would require "hacking" into enemy information systems. Passive deception takes advantage of the enemy's attempts to hack into one's own information environment and allows the capture of deceptive information. 18 This passive approach to deceptive information transfer is akin to the practice of self-defense using the philosophy of Judo.
"When one is attacked by the enemy you do not oppose him. Instead you yield to him, just like the matador yields to the bull, and you use his strength and the principle of balance to bring about his downfall. Supposing, for example, there is a blow coming at me from a certain direction. Instead of defending myself, and pushing the blow off, the idea in judo is to carry the blow away. The knee goes out, catching the adversary below his point of balance, and he drops with a 'bang' brought about on his own initiative, and your cunning." 19 Passive deception is particularly appealing in that the enemy does most of "the work."
Allowing the adversary to work at gaining information establishes authenticity. Newland states that:
"If at all possible, the enemy should be enticed to attack on our terms so that we can control what he accesses and lead him to believe he has succeeded. 20 Passive deception is attractive in that the adversary is the one conducting the CNA. As discussed in a following section, the legal aspects of conducting a CNA are considerable. Within the constraints of perfidy however, there are few restrictions on allowing a "hacker" to "take" deceptive information.
How can a CINC add digital deception as an arrow in his quiver and hardening to his or her armor? How can they facilitate the deception? What are the significant factors they must consider?
These questions are considered below. unless an established predicate of international law (such as Article 51 of the U.N. Charter) has been met, the matter remains one for the law enforcement community, intelligence community, or both. And in most cases, our initial lack of information will demand that we presume that (1) the case is a criminal matter (as opposed to a national security case) and (2) the hacker is protected by the Fourth Amendment as well as the laws of the United States. These two presumptions are both necessary and practical because of the fundamental nature of networks and of network attacks and investigations." 32 And lest the general public believe considerations of war are something for only the military to be concerned with, the DoD General Counsel also notes:
The Information Environment
"If combatant acts are conducted by unauthorized persons, their government may be in violation of the law of war, depending on the circumstances, and the individuals concerned are at least theoretically subject to criminal prosecution either by the enemy or by an international war crimes tribunal." 33 At this point, IO Law is not clearly delineated. Although the precedence set by the "law of war" with respect to conventional means is valuable and even citable, IO raises many questions with few specific answers. The DoD Counsel concludes:
"There seems to be little likelihood that the international legal system will soon generate a coherent body of 'information operations' law. The most useful approach to the international legal issues raised by information operations activities will continue to be to break out the separate elements and circumstances of particular planned activities and then to make an informed judgment as to how existing international legal principles are likely to apply to them. In some areas, such as the law of war, existing legal principles can be applied with considerable confidence. In other areas, such [as] the application of use of force principles to adopting an 'active defense,' it is much less clear where the international community will come out, and the result will probably depend more on the perceived equities of the situations in which the issues first arise in practice than on legal analysis. The growth of international law in these areas will be greatly influenced by what decision-makers say and do at those critical moments." 34 Some aspects of the "law of war" are directly applicable to the planning and conduct of digital deception. Most notably, the concept of perfidy does not change. Digital deception cannot feign surrender, cease-fire, or armistice. It cannot camouflage deployment and maneuver using the veil of neutrality or the illusion of prisoner of war and medical activities. These restrictions are valid on the physical battlefield and within the digital domain. 35 Preparation for deception may be ongoing, regardless of the CINC's status: at peace or at war. Within the constraints of current legal information law, and using the best available intelligence, deception mechanisms, including actual interactions with potential targets may be needed, before hostilities occur. Preparing the illusion and gaining the trust of the target may occur at the boundaries of the IO legal framework.
The message to the combatant commander is: IO presents a unique legal challenge.
Because IO law is in a state of flux, the CINC must ensure their legal counsel remains current on IO law evolution in order to employ effective IO and stay within the legal constraints of the day. As
CINCs plan IO activities, including deception, they should ensure that legal counsel is an active member of the planning of those efforts and that procedures are in place to ensure legal counsel review is obtained as IO occurs so that all operations remain within the constraints of the law.
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The Asymmetric Threat Asymmetric warfare can be characterized as the use of unusual, unexpected, and unpredictable strategies, operations, and tactics to offset a military power imbalance between adversaries. As the sole military superpower, the U.S. can expect virtually all adversaries to utilize asymmetric techniques. 38 Cyberspace is an enabler of asymmetric warfare. Newland observes:
"IW is a sort of "Charles Atlas in a pill," an immediate equalizer. To assume information dominance and automatic information superiority simply because of superpower status is the height of arrogance. Even the smallest, poorest country can find the resources to fund intrusions, computer viruses, logic bombs and system manipulation in the global Internet to which the US military's C4I structure is not only attached but embedded. It may not even be a country that funds such activity. The major threat may be asymmetric in nature." 39 The U.S. can expect the expanse of potential adversaries to rapidly grow with the success and relative ease of implementation of asymmetric strategies and tactics. Lind and others observe that the next generation of warfare, what they refer to as "Fourth Generation Warfare," will likely see a battlefield that will "include the whole of the enemy's society." 40 They further observe:
"…fourth generation warfare seems likely to be widely dispersed and largely undefined; the distinction between war and peace will be blurred to the vanishing point. It will be nonlinear, possibly to the point of having no definable battlefields or fronts. The distinction between 'civilian' and 'military' may disappear." Intelligence and timing are key to the combatant commander's ability to conduct deception in an asymmetric theater of operations. The field-of-view for intelligence efforts must widen to consider the full extent of potential adversaries in the CINC's area of responsibility. The CINC's intelligence organization must be prepared for quick reaction. In an asymmetric theater; adversaries will emerge, depart, and transform to a given situation with lightening fast response.
Intelligence support in such an environment is no small task, and if considered critical in traditional deception, becomes vital in digital deception. (emphasis mine). 44 Doctrine for C2W and Military Deception has similar statements emphasizing the importance of coordination. 45 Although not specifically identified in U.S. Joint C4 doctrine, digital deception will utilize C4 assets and be tied to the overall C4 infrastructure. Coordination with the overseers of the C4 system is imperative lest the deceiver becomes the deceived.
Doctrine and The Principles of Deception for the Digital Domain
U. S. doctrine for military deception as defined in Joint Pub 3-58 identifies six principles of military deception: Focus, Objective, Centralized Control, Security, Timeliness, and Integration. 46 Certain characteristics of digital deception are of interest when considering each of the principles.
Focus
As with traditional deception, an adversary decision maker must be the target. Joint Pub 3-58 states: "The adversary's intelligence system is normally not the target. It is only the primary conduit used by deceivers to get selected information to the decision maker." 47 A digital deception corollary to this pronouncement is: The information environment is normally not the target. It is only the conduit used to get selected information to the targeted decision maker.
Objective
The objective of deception, digital or otherwise, is to achieve a desired enemy decision.
Whether that decision is strategic, operational, or tactical in nature determines at which level of war the deception is associated and who the specific target will be. Therefore, deception planning at the highest level begins with identifying the desired decision, which leads to the choice of one or more targets that will either make or influence the decision. Once the target(s) are identified, their understanding and beliefs are assessed to determine the design of the deception (e.g., physical, digital, etc.). Accurate, detailed intelligence is the key to the success of deception. The more that is known of the target, their education, experience, motivations, and values, the easier it is to gain their trust through the illusion. If digital deception is to be used, specific questions to be asked 
Centralized Control
During WWII, the London Controlling Section (LCS) was the first organization established at the operational level with the sole purpose of planning deception strategies. Winston Churchill personally oversaw its design and participated in its actions. 48 The need for centralized control of digital deception efforts is only magnified by the complexities associated with operating across multiple doctrines.
Security
Churchill observed: "In war time, truth is so precious that she should always be attended by a bodyguard of lies." 49 Ensuring the security of the deception, its intent, its means, its mere existence, is critical in maintaining the trust of the target. Equally as important, the security of the intelligence sources that feed the deception is paramount. Because Churchill prized his possession of the German Enigma machine so highly, he directed no action be taken in response to decoded intercepts unless cover could be provided. 50 He went as far as to repeatedly allow naval convoys to come under U-boat attack rather than risk compromising the fact that he could break the German codes. 51 The complexity of protecting digital deception plans is elevated because of the increased amount of coordination required to take place between the various operational elements. operational forces, an IO planning cell reporting directly to the J3 is advisable. Within the IO planning cell, a cell for digital deception is needed to assign roles, responsibilities, levels of authority, and support requirements for the digital deception, and to ensure all entities within the JTF affected by the planned deception are aware of the operation and how it relates to their area of responsibility. An obvious choice to lead digital deception planning is the newly established JTF-CND. Arguably, digital deception is a form of CND, and as an element of the overall combatant command with IO responsibility (i.e., USCINCSPACE), the JTF is ideally situated to coordinate digital deception plans with the overall IO effort. On the CINC staff, Special Technical Operations (STO) has the "Big Picture" insight across the activities of the CINC to ensure necessary coordination occurs and should represent the CINC during digital deception planning.
The nuances of the principles of deception when utilizing cyberspace are subtle. They do not necessarily determine the ability to conduct digital deception, but they certainly drive the quality of the deception and the ease of implementing the deception. Digital deception is a viable and inevitable tool for the operational commander. Deception operations in the digital domain, although at their core, the same as other deception activity, do call for special considerations. The information environment is complex and dynamic. Digital deception, and IO in general are cutting new ground with respect to international law. U.S. information policies, and agency roles and responsibilities are murky at best. The asymmetric threat increases the C2W target set, collapses factor time, and magnifies factors space and force. Digital deception spans a number of critical U.S. military doctrines without specific consideration in any.
Conclusions
Conducted effectively, digital deception can be a "multiplier," a deception multiplier. When one considers the depth to which IO permeates into all aspects of military operations, deception in cyberspace gives the combatant commander the ability to develop deception in areas possibly not practical to pursue in the physical realm. Granted, some level of physical activity will be required to authenticate the digital deception. However, once authenticity is established, the scope of a deception in cyberspace can greatly exceed the physical resource limitations an operation. Effective digital deception offers the potential of being a key enabling factor in the U.S. pursuit of dominance across the cognitive hierarchy.
